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Feature Article 
GLOBAL WARMING AND THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY: CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY? 
Roger Perman, Department of Economics, 
University of Strathclyde, 
1. Introduction 
No reader of this Commentary can be unaware of the 
major issues concerning the climatic changes 
resulting from the so-called greenhouse effect. 
Recent weather behaviour in Britain and other 
parts of the world has wreaked devastating 
consequences, and there is much debate about the 
extent to which these experiences can be 
attributed to the onset of long term climate 
change, as opposed to random drawings from the 
extreme tails of "normal" distributions of weather 
patterns. The cause of recent weather behaviour 
is, however, largely irrelevant, but its 
consequences do provide indicators of what we must 
expect in forthcoming decades. Furthermore, the 
consensus view from studies of global warming is 
that weather patterns are becoming more volatile, 
with increased probabilities of extreme outcomes. 
We now have reason to believe that this increased 
variability of weather patterns may be at least as 
serious (that is, more costly to human welfare) as 
the likely changes in the mean levels of 
temperature, rainfall and other climate 
indicators. 
It is not the intention of this paper, though, to 
investigate the consequences of global warming. I 
assume on the basis of the best information 
available (represented by the papers of the 1988 
Toronto Conference, for example) that the human 
welfare costs of unhindered global warming will be 
so high (if not for this generation, then 
certainly for the next and later ones), that 
action will have to be taken both to prevent some 
additional warming and to adapt to warming that 
will already have occurred. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of global warming damage costs will be 
so high that the majority of technically feasible 
solutions (or at least ameliorative measures) will 
generate positive net returns to society. 
If these axioms are correct, then there is no need 
to assess each policy proposal for economic 
viability. That does not mean, however, that every 
feasible project to limit global warming should be 
undertaken. Such projects are costly, and so it is 
important to choose a package of measures that is 
the least costly for achieving any target level of 
limitation. In other words, we should choose cost 
effective measures. One aim of this paper is to 
provide some insight into how this cost 
effectiveness may be assessed. 
These types of question are typically addressed at 
a global or international level, or even in 
abstraction from any geographical/political 
context. This is unfortunate because responses 
will, for the foreseeable future, of necessity 
have to emanate from existing political 
structures, and analysis needs to be set in an 
appropriate institutional context. A second 
objective of this paper, therefore, is an 
examination of the role that Britain, and more 
particularly Scotland, can play in devising and 
implementing projects that can contribute to 
limiting the damage caused by global warming. 
Our final focus is upon the Scottish business and 
personal sectors. What forces will be operating 
upon Scotland's businesses and households, and 
more importantly perhaps, what opportunities are 
likely to emerge for these groups in the future? 
The economy is about to experience major 
structural shifts resulting from both global 
warming itself and the responses made here and 
elsewhere to this process. Because these 
structural adjustments will occur relatively 
slowly, they will be difficult to identify until 
after the event; however,that slowness of change 
may well be to the advantage of any economy which 
can take anticipatory action, and exploit the new 
market opportunities which will be opened up. 
We have ample historical evidence that "crisis" 
and consequent major structural change, provide 
opportunities for major improvements in living 
standards. The rapid growth of post war Germany 
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and Japan illustrate these opportunities. The 
cruciai difference between future growth and that 
of the world economy in post war years is that the 
former will only be possible on a long term basis 
(ie, sustainable) if the energy emissions to 
output coefficient is substantially reduced. Some 
indirect evidence on the possibility of achieving 
this is given in the April 1989 edition of Energy 
Policy. Energy intensity (ie the ratio of energy 
consumption to output) fell by an impressive 20% 
in the European Community in the period 1973-1982, 
the period when oil prices rose very rapidly. 
However, in the period 1982-1986, this index fell 
by only 2.4%, and actually rose in four member 
states. The pressure of high energy prices appears 
to have been important in increasing efficiency; 
in the probable absence of high prices for the 
immediate future, another impetus to efficiency 
will be required. 
As will be explained below, I believe that the 
technological base of the Scottish economy puts it 
in a strong position to take advantage of these 
opportunities for sustained growth. Whether this 
potential is realised is a matter for speculation, 
but recognition of possibilities clearly enhances 
that likelihood. 
2. Global warming, and the Scottish economy 
Before we turn our attention to the central themes 
of this paper, outlined in the Introduction, a 
brief diversion is in order. Predictions from 
global warming models relate typically to highly 
aggregated portions of the world, and it is well 
known that present modelling capabilities do not 
allow detailed pictures to be built up of the 
climatic changes likely to occur for small 
geographical areas. For Britain, this uncertainty 
is compounded by the fact that our climate is 
strongly affected by proximity to ocean currents 
and the extent and type of cloud cover; in each of 
these cases, climatological modelling is at its 
most uncertain. 
We are thus not certain of even the direction 
of change of Scottish climate, let alone the 
magnitude of the likely changes. Furthermore, 
this uncertainty is even more acute when one 
attempts to map likely climate changes into 
physical and economic consequences. Given this 
ignorance about even the direction of change, is 
it prudent to do anything at this stage? The 
answer must be in the affirmative for several 
reasons. Three of these will be mentioned here. 
(1) The earth's atmosphere, and the energy 
and material flows between the earth, 
atmosphere and sun have certain self 
regulatory properties. We may liken the 
atmosphere in particular to a thermostat which 
regulates global climate. However, once 
the forces operating within the system 
interfere with the ability of the 
thermostat to perform its control 
function, serious consequences can ensue. 
These consequences will be serious 
irrespective of the direction in which the 
disturbance occurs. 
Thus if Scotland becomes markedly colder and 
wetter (which cannot be ruled out) the 
economy, which has evolved over a very long 
period to the prevailing, largely unchanging 
climate pattern, will face major costs of 
adjustment. 
(2) Even if Scottish climate did NOT change, 
the climate will change elsewhere. Our 
economy is not closed to the outside world, 
but is heavily integrated with it. Major 
changes elsewhere will feed back through 
international trading relationships; the 
patterns of demand and supply, and the prices 
at which trades take place are all subject to 
large uncertainties. However, the appropriate 
response to uncertainty is very rarely to do 
nothing. 
(3) Although Britain (and even more so Scotland) 
acting in isolation may have relatively little 
impact on global warming, effective 
preventative action will require a concerted 
international effort that will have to be 
supported in resource terms by richer 
economies. If Western economies fail to 
undertake appropriate actions, it is difficult 
to see how other nations can be 
persuaded to undertake policies which will be 
more costly for them in real terms, given the 
pressures of economic development facing those 
economies. 
3. Cost-effectiveness, and policies to limit 
the damage caused by global warming. 
An essential prerequisite to the design of 
cost effective policy measures is a consistent set 
of accounting principles that allow identification 
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of the true costs and benefits of resource use. 
For market economies like that of Britain, 
personal and business decision makers are 
concerned with the costs and benefits they derive 
from certain actions. If all resources which are 
in any sense scarce had a price, and each price 
correctly reflected scarcity and demand, then 
market decisions might well be optimal. Let us 
illustrate this point. Think of a power station 
emitting a greenhouse gas as a by-product. This 
emission is reducing the ability of the atmosphere 
to regulate global temperature, and so incurs a 
real cost to society. If the power station 
can freely emit the pollutant, it will do so if 
that is a consequence of the production technique 
it finds most profitable. Now imagine the power 
station had to pay for the use of the atmosphere 
as a dump, by an amount equal to the real cost 
borne by society from that pollution. One would 
then expect the factory to invest in pollution-
saving equipment provided its cost were less than 
the emission damage. Thus an incentive is 
created to reduce pollution. Furthermore, the more 
polluted the atmosphere, the greater will be the 
social cost of additional units of pollution, and 
so this incentive will intensify the more polluted 
the environment becomes. 
It follows that if prices for all resources, goods 
and services were "correct" in this sense, the 
need for additional preventative or corrective 
action by public bodies would be much reduced. Any 
good or service produced by an activity which is 
seriously damaging would have a price reflecting 
that damage. This would ration the purchases of 
the good or service, thus limiting the damage. One 
important role that government should play, 
therefore, is to establish a system of subsidies 
or taxes which bring market prices into line with 
the "true" social costs of the goods or services 
in question. Such a strategy has recently become 
popularised in the Pearce Report (Pearce et al, 
1989), although the advocacy of optimal pollution 
taxes/subsidies has a long history in economic 
theory. (The Pearce Report also provides an 
excellent and non-technical discussion of the 
accounting framework just mentioned, and of 
appropriate policy design when actions have 
environmental consequences). 
The present government has made a limited 
commitment to pursuing this path, but few steps 
have yet been taken. The pace of global warming 
changes also suggests, however, that even with an 
optimal pricing system (which would be very hard 
and time-consuming to devise), positive action by 
policy makers is required now to expedite 
desirable adjustments. What sort of action should 
this be? 
One way of approaching this problem is to ask the 
following question: 
What is the cheapest way of achieving a given 
target reduction in greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere? 
If we knew the answer to this question, then it 
would be sensible to concentrate efforts (at least 
initially) on pursuing that method. For example, 
evidence collected by the British based 
Association for the Conservation of Energy 
suggests that energy conservation is considerably 
cheaper, pound for pound, than substituting 
alternative, less polluting forms of fuel for 
present fossil fuel in power generation. We could 
similarly rank all feasible projects for reducing 
pollutant concentrations in this way. A major 
research programme involving the Departments of 
Economics and Energy Studies at the University of 
Strathclyde is currently researching this 
question. 
Of course, problems such as this are much more 
difficult to address than one might first think. A 
few examples will suffice to illustrate this. 
There is, to begin with, a question of scale. We 
suggested above that energy conservation appears 
to be cost effective, based upon previous 
experiences of conservation programmes. But it is 
likely that the gains from conservation are higher 
for initial efforts than subsequent ones. In other 
words, we cannot expect to achieve total savings 
from conservation in simple proportion to the 
amount of it undertaken. A recent European 
Commission publication (EC 1988) stated: 
In contrast energy conservation has revealed an 
unexpectedly large potential, surprisingly easy to 
tap through price mechanisms or simple energy 
policy measures. Uncertainties exist as to the 
remaining potential offered by energy conservation 
now that the easiest measures have been taken. 
Take wind energy as a second example. We have 
reason to believe that wind energy is now 
competitive in cost terms with fossil fuel power 
generation; when adverse environmental effects are 
taken into account, wind energy is probably 
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cheaper at the margin. However, for a small area 
like Scotland, the amenity losses (in terms of 
visual damage etc.) are likely to rise sharply 
with scale of land area devoted to wind turbine 
farms. These types of consideration suggest that 
it is not possible to devise a uniquely "best" 
package, independent of the scale of project 
proposed. 
Secondly, and perhaps more important, we need to 
consider spatial locations of projects. Clearly 
solar power is unlikely to be economically 
desirable for large scale industrial energy 
generation in the UK, whereas it may well be in 
the Middle East. It may also be the case that £1 
billion spent on emission control in newly 
industrialising countries is more effective than 
the same sum spent on the best available project 
in the UK. A further example of this spatial 
dimension concerns reafforestation schemes. The 
scope for reafforestation in Britain is severely 
limited, no matter how desirable that may be. (It 
is interesting to note that in its current 
planning programmes, the Forestry Commission in 
Scotland places considerable emphasis on the 
potential benefits to the economy of tree planting 
and consequent fixing of atmospheric carbon). On 
the other hand, such an option has much to 
recommend it in many areas which have suffered 
major loss of tree cover. If reafforestation 
schemes could be coupled with the provision of 
wood for domestic and industrial energy in 
developing countries, this would provide a 
substitute to the fossil fuel that might otherwise 
be used, and so allow a more sustainable form of 
development. (The scale of this potential is seen 
when one realises that over half of all energy 
production in the African continent derives from 
fuelwood. Considerable scope exists for supplying 
future energy needs from fuelwood plantations, and 
small but efficient boilers could allow for this 
to be generated in a relatively clean way). 
In conclusion, it seems that for the moment policy 
makers must operate in a position of great 
uncertainty regarding the consequences of global 
warming and the benefits to be derived from any 
particular policy measures. Gradual action 
begun now will almost certainly be more cost-
effective than rapid adjustments made at later 
dates, but it is important to ensure that actions 
pursued are cost effective, thus giving the 
greatest value for money for what will inevitably 
be very costly actions. 
A. The Scottish contribution to limiting global 
warming 
The "solution" to global warming (assuming one is 
devised) will need to be the outcome of an 
international consensus, from which a programme of 
measures is designed that takes advantage of 
regional comparative advantages. Given also that 
many developing countries face acute difficulties 
in providing acceptable living standards from 
existing levels of income, one cannot expect these 
countries to place high priority on conservation 
measures during their industrialisation processes. 
But it is essential that such development is done 
in ways that are as unprofligate in terms of 
energy usage and inefficiency as possible, and 
this can only be achieved if substantial transfers 
of resources (including technology) are made from 
more affluent economies. 
What do these general remarks imply for Scotland? 
As an affluent society in global terms, it must 
expect to contribute resources to other countries 
in return for agreed limitations in emissions. 
This should not be seen as charity or foreign aid, 
but instead as payment for external benefits 
received from such emission control. These 
resource transfers will not necessarily comprise 
general financial transfers, but could be packages 
of appropriate capital and technology that allow 
more efficient use and generation of energy, 
better control of emissions, and development and 
applications of alternative energy sources. As 
will be argued in the next section, the Scottish 
economy should attempt to build competitive 
strength in these activities, and orientate this 
advantage towards international markets as quickly 
as possible. 
Unlike much previous "technology transfer", in 
which the actual transference of know-how has been 
limited (whether by design or otherwise), the aim 
should be maximum transferability. This suggests 
using joint ventures or other interactive 
organisational forms rather than 
"turnkey"projects, and also implies that 
government may need to compensate private firms 
which voluntarily lose monopoly control of 
expensively acquired technical know-how. in other 
words, the fact that technical know-how is a 
public good (in the economics sense of that term) 
should be exploited, rather than being seen as a 
justification for industrial secrecy. 
None of this means that we can ignore reducing 
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emissions in the domestic economy. Effective 
response to the problem of global warming cannot 
afford to wait until co-ordinated action begins, 
nor should it be limited in scope to the scale of 
such common action. Much scope exists for adopting 
renewable energy on both large and small scales, 
for filtering engine and factory emissions more 
thoroughly, for improving thermal efficiency of 
buildings and so on. (One example, reported by 
Offgas, the government's gas industry watchdog may 
suffice. Less than 1% of the 11.5 million gas 
central heating boilers installed in UK homes use 
gas condensing boilers. These emit one third less 
pollution than old generation boilers, but at £150 
more than rival systems, would reach payback 
within three years on average). 
Many of these measures can be undertaken now with 
no additional net cost (witness the rapid growth 
in recent years of the double glazing and energy 
conservation industry which appears able to 
operate at good rates of profit), and with 
increased demand, unit costs may fall 
considerably. Considerable controversy now exists 
with regard to the role that nuclear power should 
play in the Scottish energy system. With Torness 
on stream, 60% of Scottish electricity is now 
nuclear sourced, making her one of the most 
nuclear oriented countries in the world. Nuclear 
energy produces very low greenhouse emissions 
during operational life, but this should not mask 
the very large power inputs (and thus pollutant 
emissions) in the material assembly, construction 
and decommissioning phases. For the UK as a whole, 
Dr. Barry Dale of the Energy Technology Support 
Unit has estimated that a trebling of UK reliance 
on nuclear power would lead to a reduction of only 
11% in CO2 emissions. Given recent evidence that 
both capital and running costs of nuclear power 
exceed those for conventional power, and taking 
into account other external costs of nuclear 
power, an expanding role for this energy source 
seems not to be cost effective. In view of these 
comments, I would suggest that an appropriate 
short and medium term strategy would concentrate 
resources on energy conservation (which has a very 
impressive performance record), increasing energy 
efficiency in both power generation and power 
consumption, and integrating some alternative 
renewable energy sources into the electricity 
supply system. All of these options are currently 
viable even on purely commercial criteria. If 
pricing were to reflect all social costs and 
benefits, these options could become highly 
profitable. 
Government should provide a directing impetus too, 
by a gradual tightening of standards for new 
construction, pollutant standards and the like. In 
the medium to long term, there is a non-negligible 
probability that Scotland will be self governing; 
even in the absence of this outcome, there is 
still considerable scope for public agencies (and 
professional bodies) in Scotland to push standards 
in the suggested directions, and to exert pressure 
on national government to expedite tax or subsidy 
schemes that encourage emission reduction. 
Employment prospects in those industries linked 
into conventional energy should also be 
considered; in this respect, particular attention 
should be given to facilitating diversification 
schemes in Scotland's traditional energy 
businesses. 
5. Global warming: a time of opportunity for 
Scotland 
I remarked earlier that major structural change, 
and even times of apparent crisis, can generate 
opportunities for economic development if 
appropriate responses are made. Let us now 
consider what these opportunities may be. I am not 
arguing that a selfish or nationalistic stance is 
desirable, but simply that it is foolish to allow 
actions to be purely passive and reactive. Even in 
a world economy facing resource constraints, the 
competitive process will not disappear and we 
presumably would wish to maintain competitive 
strength. 
The opportunities I describe largely arise from 
changing patterns of demand, both personal and 
industrial. These demand changes derive in turn 
from a number of factors: 
(a) altered patterns of relative prices 
(b) altered patterns of income and wealth 
distribution within and between nations 
(c) changes in technology and in input-output 
relationships and coefficients 
(d) policy-induced demand shifts 
(e) shifts in consumer preferences. 
It would be foolish to indulge in too much crystal 
ball gazing, but the gains to be made by those 
individuals who are best informed are clear, and 
it is the case that some well-informed judgements 
with respect to points (a) to (e) are feasible. I 
will concentrate on those which may be of most 
relevance to Scotland. 
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One can expect strongly rising demand in certain 
sectors for three distinct reasons: 
1. Because we are already committed to some global 
warming whatever policies are adopted, 
reconstruction, relocation and readjustment 
work of various kinds will be required. These 
will probably include coastal defence systems, 
flood control, water and sewage infrastructural 
adaptation and new (relocated) construction 
activity. The Scottish construction industry 
is, thus, likely to be in a strong position in 
the early years of the next century, but will 
need to develop new technologies appropriate to 
these demands. 
2. The patterns of demand and prices will change, 
reflecting cost minimising choices made by 
firms and changing consumer preferences. 
Relative prices of different goods and services 
can be expected to change for a number of 
reasons, including shifts in preferences, 
policy changes and changes in technology and 
relative scarcity induced by the prospect or 
outcome of global warming. Where prices rise 
as a result of cost increases (for example when 
pollution taxes are imposed upon outputs, or 
marginal costs rise for resource extraction), 
profit expectations do not in general rise (and 
indeed are likely to fall). But for many 
commodities, prices will rise as a result of 
demand increases, and in these cases firms can 
expect enhanced profits and should allocate 
additional resources into their production. 
Indeed, we already have ample evidence to show 
that consumer demands are changing, and that 
firms will need to respond to these changes if 
they are to maintain profitability. What is yet 
to be felt are major changes in demands for 
capital and intermediate goods. Candidate areas 
for major demand expansion in this respect 
include: 
-biotechnology research and applications 
-energy control and energy efficiency systems 
-business financial, planning and management 
consultancy services 
-emission control equipment and monitoring 
systems 
-vehicle engine design and construction 
-district space heating systems 
-waste-to-energy applications 
-high performance materials 
-energy storage schemes 
-semi-conductor applications 
When we take account of international demand, 
and the consequent export possibilities, the 
list may also include such activities as water 
resource development, desalination schemes, 
irrigation technology, crop research and 
development, biogas engine technology and soil 
stabilisation schemes. This lists are far from 
exhaustive and could easily be considerably 
extended. 
3. Policy constraints 
Whatever individuals and firms choose to do, 
another overlay on this picture will reflect 
constraints imposed by policy. It is very 
likely that quantitative controls on the inputs 
and outputs of various goods and resources will 
be imposed by public bodies, both in the UK and 
elsewhere. Such constraints would further alter 
the structure of demand. Predicting policy 
responses is particularly hazardous at the best 
of times, but it is reasonable to presume that 
policy controls would tend to reinforce the 
demand changes just described. 
It is clear from a perusal of this list of 
candidate sectors for expansion that the 
Scottish economy is in a strong position to 
take advantage of these opportunities. It 
already possesses production and/or research 
capacity in several of these activities, 
including pollution control (eg Babcock 
Engineering), desalination technologies (with a 
strong research base at Glasgow University), 
and in more general terms, strength in 
alternative energy research, and energy 
conservation and efficiency schemes. 
The financial and business services sector is 
well established in the major Scottish cities, 
and we possess a strong base for consultancy 
services in the fields of planning, business 
management, engineering and technological 
innovation. 
The interface between research in academic 
institutions and industrial innovation and 
application has improved dramatically in recent 
years. Most Scottish higher education 
institutions have established technical 
consultancy businesses, or forged links with 
private sector establishments, and several of 
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these activities have exhibited dramatic rates 
of growth. 
A particular feature shared by many of the 
sectors is their heavy dependence on research, 
development and information, and the linkages 
of the activities to the science and 
engineering, and business management 
infrastructures. The Scottish economy has great 
strength, to some extent underexploited, in 
each of these areas. Many business and 
engineering graduates leave Scotland soon after 
qualification, in the absence of a sufficiently 
large local market for their skills; I am the 
suggesting that the demand side of these 
markets is likely to be considerably enlarged 
in the medium and longer term future. What 
needs to be high on the policy agenda is the 
encouragement of supply side capacity to 
respond to these demands. 
The outlook is not entirely rosy however. 
Scotland is considerably ovei—supplied in terms 
of power at the moment, and this excess supply 
is expected to persist for some time. Taken in 
conjunction with the current low real prices of 
fossil fuels, there is little commercial 
incentive to adopt or develop cleaner energies. 
The prices of energy are essentially "wrong", 
being set at levels well below their true 
social marginal costs. Until tax and subsidy 
schemes push relative energy and resource 
prices closer to their true social costs, there 
will be little chance of private markets making 
some of the adjustments that are widely agreed 
to be desirable. 
6. Conclusions 
Industrial policy and environmental policy may 
have been seen as essentially unrelated in the 
past, but can no longer be treated as independent. 
Scottish entrepreneurial skill may be sufficient 
to identify the market opportunities described in 
earlier sections of this paper, but a more 
cautious approach would suggest the judicious use 
of public sector catalysts to expedite the capture 
of these opportunities. I would suggest that a 
number of steps should be pursued as soon as 
possible. 
A. The Scottish Development Agency should 
establish an advisory and co-ordinating 
capacity to encourage and facilitate private 
sector capacity in each of the activity areas 
identified above. The precise ways in which 
this should be operationalised will be left for 
the reader to ponder. 
B. There are several areas in which research and 
development should be considerably increased. 
These include bio-technology applications, 
advanced materials engineering for high stress 
environments, solar technology applications, 
pollution control and monitoring, energy 
storage schemes, and semi-conductor 
innovation. 
C. Competitions, offering substantial pecuniary 
rewards, should be launched with the intention 
of encouraging innovations in these and other 
areas. The major Scottish banks may well be 
encouraged to consider financing such 
competitions, given the commercial returns they 
could expect from financing winning schemes. 
Bodies such as Scottish Enterprise could play 
an important role too in this regard. 
In the longer term, it is imperative that 
relative prices adequately reflect social 
costs. All steps towards this goal should be 
taken at the earliest time possible. 
What is clear is that while it would be 
dangerous to ignore warnings of impending 
environmental crisis, a more fruitful attitude 
is that which searches for commercial prospects 
that will arise. By harnessing these 
opportunities, we are most likely to develop 
the conditions for sustainable development. 
Footnotes 
1. The validity of this claim may not be 
immediately obvious, so a little explanation is 
warranted. Assume critical threshold levels of 
total greenhouse gas concentration exist, such 
that beyond these levels, further emissions of 
substantial quantities will cause substantial 
alterations in climate. Further assume that 
these climatic changes result in large costs in 
terms of flood damage, crop failure, and so on. 
If the world economy continues to emit 
pollutants, then a time will arrive at which 
thresholds such as these will be reached. The 
objective of policy is to prevent 
concentrations of pollutants passing these 
threshold levels, or at the very least to put 
forward in time the point at which the 
thresholds are hit. 
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A project today which reduces emissions may 
well have very limited current benefits, but in 
so far as it delays or avoids this threshold 
effect, will have large benefits in the future. 
Whether we, today, believe that it is worth 
incurring current costs to derive future 
benefits depends on our degree of inter 
generational concern. What is clear, though, is 
that if action is not taken now, it will be 
required on a much greater scale later, and we 
have good reason to believe that the unit costs 
of adjustment will be far higher the greater 
the scale of adjustment. This suggests that if 
policy makers wish to optimise policy over a 
longish horizon, gradual anticipatory action 
will be more cost effective than sudden 
adjustment. 
Note also that this argument was couched in 
terms of threshold effects. However, the 
essence of this argument remains true even if 
there is a more proportional relationship 
between emission levels and damage. 
2. Current best forecasts for Scottish climate 
changes and their consequences in the middle of 
the next century suggest the following. Mean 
temperatures will be about 3 degrees Celsius 
higher than now, growing areas will shift 300 
feet upwards, and a wide variety of trees, 
shrubs and plants currently unsuited to 
Scottish climate will be supported in Scotland. 
Crop yields and vegetation growth rates in 
general will increase. Although some "losses" 
will probably occur, such a prospect is, in 
itself, far from unattractive. But two points 
should be stressed. First, such predictions are 
subject to massive uncertainty. Second, the 
future standard of living of Scots is dependent 
very strongly upon the ways in which climate 
changes occur elsewhere in the world. A 
parochial stance which looks forward to a 
superior future local climate is thus 
misplaced. 
3. Scarcity is used here in the economic sense, 
not its common usage. That is, a resource is 
said to be scarce if its supply is finite, and 
demand (over all time periods) at zero price 
would exceed that supply. In this sense, 
virtually all resources, goods and services are 
scarce. 
on Energy. Land wind energy is estimated to be 
generated at 2.26 p KWh, compared with CEGB 
electricity from coal at 3.5 p KWh, and nuclear 
costs of not less than 6.3 p KWh. Wind energy 
is at present easily the cheapest alternative 
source of (large scale) energy production in 
the UK. 
5. This possibility has a high likelihood. Newly 
industrialising countries will tend to develop 
i n ways that are energy wastefu1, and so the 
potential gains to be made by enhancing 
efficiency, for example, are correspondingly 
high. 
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